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DISCIPLINARY DISCHARGES,
ARBITRATION AND NLRB DEFERENCE
JAMES

B. ATLESON*

T

he National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) was primarily
aimed at protecting employee rights through the medium of
collective action.' Since organization was to be the device whereby
fair treatment would be secured for employees, the Act had to
provide protection for collective and institutional rights. In addition, since individual employee action might sometimes thwart
group endeavors, some individual interests necessarily had to be
submerged for the common good. 2
Judicial and administrative interpretation of the NLRA has
placed further restrictions on the expression of individual interests. Thus, as in wildcat or unauthorized strike situations, the
very presence of a union will render otherwise protected conduct
unprotected.3 Choosing collective action as the vehicle for the
protection of individual interests, whether statutory or contractual, has had an effect on the scope of permissible individual
action. The medium of protection chosen is, therefore, part of
the message.
Irrespective of the merits of the particular balance chosen
between individual and institutional or collective concerns, these
developments often tend toward an institutional bias in decisionmaking which unduly defers to corporate interests and unnecessarily sacrifices individual rights and expectations. This bias
is encouraged by the traditional stress on other interests; thus,
industrial stability and efficiency have been used to compromise
individual interests. A union, for instance, receives a "certification year" in which to bargain with an employer despite changes
in employee sentiment. "Contract bar" rules forestall representaProfessor of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo. B.A., Ohio State
University, 1960, J.D., 1962; LL.M., Stanford University, 1964.
1. Although the problem of accommodating individual interests to institutional
concerns is important in all areas of the law, it has a special immediacy in labor law.
Since this article will no doubt be read, however, if at all, primarily by knowledgeable
people in the labor area, an attempt was made to exclude unnecessary background information in text and footnotes. Footnotes which would not aid further research have
been omitted.
2. A somewhat fuller discussion can be found in Atleson, Union Fines and Picket
Lines: The NLRA and Union Disciplinary Power, 17 U.C.LA.L. Rxv. 681-85 (1970).
3. Id. at 683-84.
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tion elections during the life of an agreement, and a rival's
economic pressure is prohibited as long as the incumbent is certified, lawfully recognized, or an election has been held within the
previous year. Moreover, the NLRB's severance and decertification rules make it extremely difficult for groups of employees to
break out of a previously established bargaining unit.
These comments should not be taken as criticisms of the
balance chosen in particular situations. Blind enforcement of
individual interests would drastically alter labor-management
relations and would not ultimately be in the best interests of all
employees. Those who have defended the basic principles of
federal labor policy are justifiably suspicious of those who broadly
criticize the protection of group rather than individual interests.
Nevertheless, due consideration of individual interests may often
be foreclosed unconsciously by the fear that the industrial relations system is too weak to afford greater protection to individual
interests. For example, the Supreme Court recently considered
the scope of union disciplinary power under the NLRA. 4 Although
section 8 (b) (1). (A) protects individual acts of disobedience, the
Court did not consider the individual interests involved. Similar
treatment is found in cases dealing with arbitration systems. Thus,
the Court has broadly accepted the arbitral process and minimized the extent of judicial review in the Steelworkers' TrilogyY
given the formal parties almost complete control of the process,
and provided obstacles to an employee's claim that he has been
unfairly represented by his union. 6 Finally, when faced with an
employee's claim that he was discriminatorily discharged, the
NLRB will often defer to an arbitral award upholding his discharge. Should the NLRB find that minimal procedural due
process was afforded in the arbitration proceeding, and the
decision was not grossly at variance with federal labor policy, the
NLRB will not review the merits of the alleged statutory violation.
The focus of this article is the NLRB's policy of deference to
arbitral awards in discharge cases. Although there has been little
4. See Atleson, supra note 2, at 681 et seq.
5. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp., 863 U.S. 593 (1960);
United Steelworkers v. Warrior and Gulf Navigation Co., 863 U.S. 574 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. American Manufacturing Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
6. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
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published concern, the area is critically important to the employees involved. Moreover, the rule of law is ill served by policies
which delegate the resolution of public rights to private parties
who may be indifferent or even hostile to the individual rights
involved.
The theme of this article is that the federal interest in preventing discriminatory discharges receives insufficient protection
under the NLRB's deference policies. The most serious cases are
those in which individual interests may conflict with the mutual
concerns of the employer and the union. In these cases, the
NLRB's guidelines for invoking its policy of deference to arbitral
awards are too porous to guarantee that the employee was fairly
represented before the arbitrator or that the arbitrator was sensitive to the individual interests involved. Importantly, a policy of
non-deference would neither undermine nor interfere with the
private settlement of labor disputes. The NLRB and arbitrators
have different roles, and consequently they are concerned with
different questions. Action by the NLRB does not attack the
integrity of arbitration, for the NLRB's focus is statutory, not
contractual. Nor is it foreseeable that employees will be encouraged
to file charges with the Board after unsuccessful arbitration pro,
ceedings. Encouragement of meritorious charges, of course, could
not be challenged, and it is simply not clear that a reversal of the
NLRB's deference policy would encourage the filing of nonmeritorious charges. Employees may not be informed of the
NLRB's policies in this regard, and, in any event, the Board's
informal settlement procedures are more than sufficient to screen
out frivolous charges.
Finally, the Board's policy of deferring to arbitral awards in
discharge cases is inconsistent with its common refusal to defer
in refusal to bargain cases, despite the resultant interference with
the grievance-arbitration system involved and the lack of an
independent statutory interest.
DEFERENCE TO ARBITRAL AwARDs: STATED AND SUSPECTED
ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTIFICATIONS

When an employeb alleges that his discharge was in violation
of the NLRA, the NLRB may refuse to inquire into the merits of
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the charge and defer to an arbitral award upholding the employer's action. The NLRB's position is that barring gross violations of procedural due process or an arbitral decision clearly
at variance with federal law, the Board need not consider the
merits of the unfair labor practice charge."
The NLRB's delegation to a private arbitrator has been
justified on two grounds." First, the NLRB understandably desires
to conform its procedures to the federal policy encouraging the
private settlement of labor disputes. Arbitration procedures might
be undermined, and their popularity lessened, if a losing grievant
could, in effect, relitigate his grievance before the NLRB. Under
the NLRB's deference standards, however, some investigation
will be made since the NLRB recognizes that undue deference
may jeopardize public rights protected by the NLRA. Therefore,
the relevant question is whether the NLRB's policy unduly
sacrifices public rights and, indeed, whether the inability of employees to have the NLRB consider the merits of their claims
actually aids the policy in favor of private settlement.0
The NLRA does not clearly define the NLRB's responsibility
in relation to arbitration procedures. Section 10(a) provides that
the Board's power over unfair labor practices "shall not be affected
by any other means of adjustment or prevention that has been or
may be established by agreement, law or otherwise."' 10 The NLRB
7. The traditionally cited cases are International Harvester Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 928
(1962); Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955).
8. McCulloch, The Arbitration Issue in NLRB Decisions, 19 ARn. J. (n.s.) 134,
135-36 (1964).
9. A related problem concerns the relationship of grievance arbitration and federal
rights protected by the Civil Rights Act. The Sixth Circuit has recently held that an
employee's claim of religious discrimination under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), may not be adjudicated when an arbitrator has ruled against
the claim. Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 2 F.E.P. Cases 687 (6th Cir. 1970). The holding
:goes beyond mere deference, for it holds that the arbitrator's adverse ruling forecloses
federal court relief. The court's justification, however, is similar to the policies under'lying the NLRB's deference policies. The action cannot be brought, for this situation
"could sound the death knell to arbitration of labor disputes which has been so usefully
,employed in their settlement. Employers would not be inclined to agree to arbitration
-clauses .. . if they provide only a one-way street, i.e., that the awards are binding upon
them but not on their employees." The reliance upon the Trilogy is made express in
the court's denial of a petition for rehearing, wherein Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks
Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970), is cited as support. Dewey v. Reynolds Metal Co.,
2 F.E.P. Cases 869 (6th Cir. 1970). But see Culpepper v. Reynolds Metal Co., 421 F.2d
£88 (5th Cir. 1970); Hutchings v. U.S. Indus., Inc., 2 F.E.P. Cases 725 (5th Cir. 1970);
Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969).
10. Section 10 (a), 29 U.S.C. § 160 (a) (1964).
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has interpreted this language to mean that deference to arbitration
can only be a matter of discretion or comity. Since contract
breaches, and unfair labor practices often overlap, parallel or
concurrent avenues of relief are necessary to avoid weakening
either grievance procedures or NLRB authority. Thus, section
301 actions for breaches of collective bargaining contracts may be
brought despite the presence of conduct that falls within the
statutory competence of the NLRB, 11 and the NLRB may proceed
despite the contention that the alleged statutory violations are
also contract breaches.1
Section 10 (a), however, expressly refers only to settlement
procedures aimed at resolving unfair labor practices. Thus, it
does not expressly refer to the arbitration of contract disputes.
Taft-Hartley declared that "[f]inal adjustment by a method
agreed upon- by the parties is . . . the desirable method for the

settlement of grievance disputes arising over the application or
interpretation of an existing collective bargaining agreement." 1
This section refers expressly to the settlement of contract issues
only, and, thus, it does not command a policy of deference to
arbitration procedures. The thrust of the latter provision, however, along with the development of section 301, may indicate
that a liberal accommodation by the NLRB is necessary. The provisions of the NLRA, however, do not materially assist in drawing
a demarcation line between private and public settlement procedures, nor do they provide guidelines for an NLRB policy of
deference.
The contours of the NLRB's deference policy, then, are not
dictated by express provisions of the NLRA. More responsible,
perhaps, is the NLRB's understanding of the developing federal
law of arbitration. With the increased importance of arbitration
after the Steelworkers' Trilogy, there is understandable pressure
on the Board to recognize and encourage the arbitral process.
Furthermore, recent judicial pronouncements suggest that deference, in some cases at least, may be more than a matter of discretion. Although the Supreme Court has indicated that the
11. Carey v. Westinghouse, 375 U.S. 261 (1964); Smith v. Evening News, 371 U.S.
195 (1962).
12. NLRB v. C & C Plywood Corp., 385 U.S. 421 (1967).
13. Labor-Management Relations Act § 203(d), 29 U.S.C. § 178(d) (1964).
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Board may interpret an agreement to enforce a statutory right,
it has more recently noted that there may be limits to administrative authority. Thus, in NLRB v. C & C Plywood Corp.14 the
Court stressed that the Board had not "exceeded" its statutory
jurisdiction in interpreting provisions of an agreement, and it
also noted that no arbitration clause had been agreed to by the
parties. Thus, the Board's "action was in no way inconsistent with
its previous recognition of arbitration as 'an instrument for com-posing contractual differences.' " 15
C & C Plywood involved a claim that the employer's action
was unilateral, and, hence, violated section 8(a)(5). As will be
-argued subsequently, this kind of case presents the strongest situation for a policy of deferral to arbitration since the statutory ques'tion-the alleged "unilateral" nature of the conduct-is inextric'ably bound up with the contractual issue and no independent
'federal interest 'is served "by NLRB scrutiny. In discharge cases,
on the other hand, "discrimination" or "interference" need not
-'be coterminus with a contractual "just cause" provision, and the
'employee's interest may conflict with the interests of the "parties"
-to the agreement.' 6
Given the lack of clear limitations on the NLRB's responsibility in these areas, it is understandable that the NLRB will
attempt to carefully avoid undue interference with private settlement machinery. The proposition presented herein is that interference has been purchased at an unnecessarily high price.
The second commonly mentioned justification for NLRB
deference is the need to decrease the NLRB's admittedly staggering case load. In fiscal 1968, the NLRB received 30,705 cases of
which 17,816 (58%) were unfair labor practice cases.' 7 During
this year the agency closed 30,750 cases-about 13,000 relating to
14. 385 U.S. 421, 428 (1967).
15. Id. at 426. See also id. at 429.

16. The NLRB has generally refused to defer in unilateral act cases like C & C
Plywood even where arbitration procedures were present. See, e.g., Clover Leaf Division
.of Adams Dairy Co., 147 N.R.L.B. 1410 (1964) (hereinafter referred to as Adams Dairy].
Although the precise effect of C & C Plywood on these cases is unclear, the Board actions
demonstrate that something more than a policy of encouraging private settlement must
be involved in discharge cases.
17. Thirty-third Annual Report of the NLRB for Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1968,
.at 1.
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representation issues and over 17,000 involving unfair labor practice issues.
Given the annual increase in the Board's caseload and the
normal failure of government to match workload with necessary
appropriations, it is understandable that the NLRB should attempt to reduce its caseload whenever possible. The primary
structural device for effecting such a reduction is the Board's informal settlement procedure. Under this procedure charges are
screened, dropped or relief attempted on a voluntary basis. These
procedures are extremely effective, accounting for approximately
ninety percent of all charges closed.
The effectiveness of the informal procedures can be seen
from the following figures. In fiscal 1968 more than 91.9 percent
of the 17,000 unfair labor practice cases were closed by regional
offices without formal decision. Twenty-six percent were settled
or voluntarily compromised by the parties, thirty-five percent were
withdrawn by the charging party, and thirty percent were dismissed by the regional office.18 Thus, only 5.6 percent of all cases
closed went to the NLRB for formal adjudication. The General
Counsel issued only 2,004 formal complaints, although this represents an all-time high.
The success of the Board's informal procedures indicates that
decided cases represent only a rough guide to labor law in action.
In addition, the NLRB's formal policy of deference in discharge
cases will have a great effect on the administration of the NLRA
at the regional levels, operations which will not be reflected in
published records. Traditional research, then, -will not reveal the
actual incidence of arbitral deference by the NLRB.
The very efficiency of informal procedures, however, suggests that deference is not required to ease the Board's case load.
Adequate screening devices are available to weed out nonmeritorious claims. Indeed, the NLRB's deference policy requires an
investigation into matters not strictly relevant to the merits of
unfair labor practice charges. Thus, in discharge cases in which an
arbitrator has upheld the employer's action, the NLRB will
inquire into the procedure as well as the substance of the arbitral
proceeding. Since this investigation is required only by the
18.

Id.
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NLRB's own policies, the usefulness of these policies in lessening
the Board's case load is dubious, especially given the informal
procedures available to the NLRB. One possible hypothesis,
examined subsequently, is that deference may assist the NLRB
to avoid meritorious charges, indicating that these cases do not
rank high on the Board's list of priorities.
Observation suggests that a number of other factors, unrelated
to the merits of the complaint, may lead to dismissals of charges
at the regional level. First, the discharged employee may charge
his union as well as his employer with wrongdoing, such as a
failure to represent him fairly, and perhaps focusing on the arbitration proceeding itself. The allegation that the union has unfairly represented the grievant before the arbitrator, one of the
NLRB's considerations under its deference policy, is also a claim
upon which an action can be initiated in court. Given this judicial "alternative," regional offices may be motivated to dismiss
any case which is not blindingly clear. Despite the NLRB's recent
entrance into the fair representation area after years of judicial
development, 19 local offices often seem reluctant to get involved.
The ability of the employee to challenge the union's action
in court is, however, often illusory. Court challenges take time and
money; the employee usually does not have the latter and will
often not spend the former. As in other areas of labor law, the
result is that fair representation cases are often brought where a
number of fortuitous circumstances exist: (1) an employee feels
very strongly about the union's alleged unfairness, 20 (2) he overcomes his normal aversion or ignorance of the law and lawyers,
as well as social fears over suing his union, and (3) he finds an
attorney willing to take his case in an area where the law is vague
19. Local Union No. 12, United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum and Plastic Workers of
America, AFL-CIO, 150 N.L.R.B. 312 (1964), enforcement granted, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir.
1966), cert. de'iied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967); Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962),
enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963). See Sovern, The National Labor Relations Act and Racial Discrimination,62 COLUM. L. REv. 563 (1962), and a sequel, Race
Discrimination and The National Labor Relations Act: The Brave New World of Mi.
randa, 16TH ANNUAL N.Y.U. CONFERENCE ON LABOR 3, 10 (1963).
20. Professor Summers found in 1960 that "more than 3/4 of the reported cases in

which individuals have sought legal protection of their rights under a collective agreement have arisen out of disciplinary discharges." Summers, Individual Rights in Collective Agreements: A Preliminary Analysis, 9 BUFFALO L. REv. 239, 252 (1960).
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and recovery remote, or an attorney who is1 willing to volun2
tarily donate his time out of altruistic motives.
Another "alternative" avenue of relief is a contractual grievance procedure which has not yet been employed. Although the
Board once deferred to an arbitration procedure which could
resolve the dispute,22 the Board has recently been reluctant to
defer to potential arbitration involving discharges allegedly made
for union activities.2 3 In practice, however, regional offices will
defer action pending arbitral resolution if the private procedure
is being "actively pursued" and there is a substantial likelihood
that utilization of the procedure will resolve the dispute. 24
The two sets of standards do not mesh, for grievance procedures may be "actively pursued," satisfying regional offices,
even though the discharge concerned protected activities. In fact,
however, the standards need not mesh, for if the General Counsel
refuses to act, the particular case is at an end. One possible explanation is that the NLRB will refuse to defer, in agreement
with the General Counsel, when it feels that arbitration will not
resolve the dispute adequately. Perhaps the General Counsel is
more likely to come to that conclusion when the protected nature
of the employee's conduct is dear. In these cases, perhaps, federal
policy may not be served by the delays inherent in a policy of
deference.
It is important to note that a refusal by the NLRB to defer
to an existing arbitration system means that the Board agrees with
the General Counsel that the merits should be reached. In cases
where the NLRB defers, it specifically rejects the General Counsel's charge and refuses to consider the merits, even though the
trial examiner may have upheld the charge. In fair representation
cases, and cases allegedly subject to arbitration, then, another
forum exists to vindicate the employee's interest, and the NLRB
21. This problem applies to other areas of labor law where litigation is the chosen
vehicle for the enforcement of employee rights. See Atleson, A Union Member's Right
of Free Speech and Assembly: Institutional Interests and Individual Rights, 51 MINN. L.
REV. 403, 483-89 (1967); Summers, The Law of Union Discipline: What the Courts Do in
Fact, 70 YALE L.J. 175, 221 (1960).
22. See, e.g., Flintkote Co., 149 N.L.R.B. 1561 (1964); Dubo Mfg. Co., 142

N.L.R.B. 431 (1963).
23. Producers Grain Corp., 169 N.L.R.B. No. 68, 67 L.R.R.M. 1247 (1968); Fiasco Mfg.
Co., 162 N.L.R.B. 611 (1967); Thor Power Tool Co., 148 N.L.R.B. 1379 (1964).
24. Ordman, The Arbitrator and the NLRB, in Tm ARmrrATOR, THE NLRB, AND
THE Coutars 47, 56 (Jones ed. 1967).
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often decides to forego intervention despite
the presence of criti5
cal interests within the NLRB's domain.2
Another factor possibly present here, although one hesitates
to raise it, involves an irony of NLRB operation. The conflict
between unions and employers, it is thought, makes it impossible
for the NLRB to become captured by the economic forces it seeks
to regulate. That formulation, however, overlooks the fact that
an employee may represent an interest different from and, perhaps, in conflict with, the interests of union and management.
When union and managerial interest coincide and the interest of
the employee is in conflict, the NLRB might well decide to favor
the representatives of the "system."
The reasons for such an approach are not difficult to list.
First, many employee complaints undoubtedly lack merit, and an
employee's insistence and pugnaciousness may be inversely proportional to his articulateness and knowledge of the NLRA. The
percentage of nonmeritorious and even frivolous charges may
well be high. Staff members may exhibit understandable, although
nevertheless regrettable, impatience with the charges of individual
employees, and employees are often told to abide by arbitral
awards or seek union assistance. Employees may view their treatment as based upon indifference or even hostility. Even if informal procedures are involved, the employee is often distressed
at the seeming casualness of the investigation as well as its duration.
Second, an employee who challenges a grievance settlement
is often considered a "troublemaker" by both labor and management. It is not hard to believe that NLRB staff members often
share that view. The staff is often in contact with local union officers, employers, and their counsel, 2 and may begin to view some
25. The Board's great faith in arbitration is demonstrated by recent cases in which
the Board has ordered arbitration where the union had illegally refused to process an
employee's grievance. Although the Board retained jurisdiction should arbitration not
effectively resolve the dispute, such extraordinary deference is unnecessary and unwise
given the union's past behavior and the amount of NLRB time already invested in the
case. I.U.E. Local 485, 170 N.L.R.B. No. 121, 67 L.R.R.M. 1609 (1968); Port Drum Co., 170
N.L.R.B. No. 51, 67 L.R.R.M. 1506 (1968). Yet the Board does not require restort to
arbitration as a matter of deference where the employer refused to proceed to arbitration. Omaha Neon Sign Co., 170 N.L.R.B. No. 150, 68 L.R.R.M. 1585 (1968); Fiasco
Mfg. Co., 162 N.L.R.B. 611 (1967).
26. See Bernstein, The NLRB's Adjudication Rule-Making Dilemma Under the
Administrative ProcedureAct, 79 YALE L.J. 571, 577-87 (1970).

364
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situations from similar perspectives. In addition, the NLRB's
public acceptance may not be materially advanced by protecting
an employee whose discharge is of little concern to his own union.
Moreover, if a union and employer can agree, even through
a neutral arbitrator, that "just cause" exists, the NLRB might
easily believe that its time could be better allocated elsewhere.
The weight given to concerns for industrial harmony and efficiency in other areas27 may support an interest in administrative
28
efficiency.
Professor Peck has perhaps stated the primary rationale for
Board deference in discharge cases: "[I]f one may set an order of
priority for use of the resources of the Board, discharge cases involving employers who have entered into collective bargaining
'29
relationships probably should not be given a high ranking.
Professor Peck felt that these cases do not usually present significant policy issues but instead turn on factual questions upon
which the Board may not be superior to an arbitrator. The thesis
of this article is that the protection of employees from illegal discharge is a significant policy issue and that, although these cases
often involve factual questions, only the NLRB can properly
place these facts in the context of federal labor law.
The problem is not solely one of abstract justice. Deference
to awards considered suspect by employees has a devastating effect
on employee morale and respect for law. Although an employee
may be unaccustomed to using the law, he often has a high respect
for it, and especially for the protection afforded his economic
rights under federal law. To find that he must now contend with
the NLRB as well as his employer, and perhaps the union as
well, is a bitter pill indeed. The political ramifications of this
disaffection from respect for legal processes should also not be
ignored.30 The practical problems of the Board's deference policy
are illustrated in the next section.
27. See Atleson, supra note 2, at 682-85.
28. The NLRB's rejection of individual concern is sometimes startling as well as
frank: "[T]he parties have found that machinery which they have created . . . has adequately served its purpose." Denver-Chicago Trucking Co., 132 N.L.R.B. 1416, 1421
(1961).
29. Peck, Accommodation and Conflict Among Tribunals: Whatever Happened to
Preemption?, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 15TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON LABOR LAW 121, 147 (1969).

30. S. Liusrr, Working-Class Authoritarianism in
BASIS OF POLITICS (Anchor ed. 1959).

POLITICAL

MAN:

THE

SOCIAL

BUFFALO LAW RE VIII"
DEFERENCE IN ACTION: THE

NLRB's FAILURE

TO GUARANTEE PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS AND TO
PROTECT FEDERAL INTERESTS

A series of hypothetical situations will aid in understanding
the weaknesses in current NLRB policies. The NLRB's policies
neither guarantee that federal interests are accorded protection
nor can they adequately uncover procedural unfairness in arbitral
proceedings.
Case I. The employee has been discharged for sloppy work or for
disobeying a plant rule. The union carried the grievance to arbitration, but the arbitrator upheld the discharge. The employee
files a charge with the NLRB alleging discrimination within section 8(a)(3).
Case II. The employee has been discharged for leading a wildcat
walkout which the agreement expressly lists as a ground for discipline. Again, the union has grieved, but the discharge has been
upheld. Claiming discrimination for participating in a protected
activity, the employee files a charge with the NLRB.
Case III. The employee has been discharged for failure to tender
dues required under a union security agreement. The union
secured the discharge, and the employer represented the employee's interests before the arbitrator. The discharge was upheld.
The NLRB has refused to reach the merits of 8(a)(1) and
8(a)(3) claims in cases similar to those sketched above by deferring to arbitration awards upholding the employer's disciplinary
measures. If the Board finds that its standards are met, the em-

ployee's charge is dismissed. Each case raises problems, however,
and even Case I may contain hidden problems.
Case I: The NLRB and Arbitrators:Differing Roles,
Responsibilities, and Decisional Contexts
Admittedly, Case I presents the least disturbing situation for
the NLRB's exercise of discretion. The facts present no conflict
of interest between the employee and his union, and nothing may
suggest that the interests of the employee were not firmly advocated by his union. Moreover, the arbitrator may have faced and
resolved the relevant federal questions. Although this is rarely

NLRB DEFERENCE

expressed as a major consideration by the NLRB, it does explain
some cases, and it certainly should-be a primary consideration."
Nevertheless, "just cause" for discharge under an agreement does
not necessarily mean that prohibited discrimination under sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) has not occurred, and this may be true
even if contractual language parallels the statute.
Although most arbitrators will no doubt attempt to interpret
contractual provisions to comply with federal law, there is a wide
difference of opinion as to the arbitrator's role when no such
coincidental interpretation can be made. 2 Many arbitrators feel
they are creatures of the parties, and thus, bound by the agreement despite federal law and despite the delegation of federal
authority to arbitrators inherent in the Supreme Court's Trilogy.
Thus, the arbitrator may uphold the contractual validity of the
disciplinary action even though the NLRB might find discrimination on the basis of protected activities. The NLRB's deference
policy, however, often forecloses review of the employee's federal
claim. The significant point here is that the NLRB will not permit discrimination even though grounds for discharge might ordinarily exist

33

but the arbitrator's balancing of interests and bur-

den of proof might not be the same. In addition, the NLRB's
investigating ability far exceeds that of an arbitrator.
It is important to note that NLRB review does not derogate
the integrity of arbitration procedures. Its investigation into the
merits of the unfair labor practice charge merely recognizes the
different role each tribunal plays as well as the structural limitations on the arbitrator's ability to discover facts. A broad policy
of deference, however, may exclude meritorious federal claims
from consideration as well as claims in which the federal interest
in employee protection has been satisfied.
31. The NLRB's task is considerably simplified if the arbitrator acknowledges that
he has ignored relevant statutory principles. See, e.g., Monsanto Chemical Co., 130
N.L.R.B. 1097 (1961).
32. See Howlett, The Arbitrator, the NLRB, and the Courts, in TiH ARBITRATOR,
THE NLRB, AND THE CouRTs 67 (Jones ed. 1967); Meltzer, Ruminations About Ideology
Law and Labor Arbitration, 34 U. CHL L. REV. 545, 556-61 (1967).
33. See, e.g., Steve's Sash and Door, Inc., 74 L.R.R.M. 2765 (5th Cir. 1970); NLRB
v. The Princeton Inn Co., 424 F.2d 264, 265 (3rd Cir. 1970) ("A discharge that is partially motivated by the employee's protected activity violates the Act despite the concurrent existence of an otherwise valid reason."); Budd Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 138 F.2d 86
(3d Cir. 1943).
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Case 11: The Undiscoverabilityof Unfairness in
Arbitral Proceedings

Case II raises additional problems because of the possibility
that fairness may not have been accorded in the arbitral proceeding. As will be seen, the NLRB due process standards are too

porous to guarantee fairness. Although these problems are primarily subjective rather than structural, the context of arbitration
proceedings may unintentionally hinder the consideration of
grievances of particular employees.
In Eazor Express Corp.,3 4 for instance, the employee, a union
steward, was informed while at home that supervisors and clerical

employees were loading freight. This performance of unit work
by non-unit employees was a clear violation of the agreement, and
an arbitrator subsequently awarded overtime pay to unit employees.
The steward, however, was not as fortunate. He claimed,
supported by other employees, that he arrived at the freight dock
and asked for an explanation, but was ordered off the dock. The
steward refused to leave, was discharged, and all unit employees
on duty walked out to protest the discharge. The terminal manager and director of operations, however, claimed that the steward
instructed on-duty employees to punch out and leave the premises, causing a work stoppage. The agreement allegedly sanctioned
stewards who took strike actions without official union authorization.
At this point, it could be argued that since the dispute is one
of fact, rather than law, arbitration is adequate to resolve the
dispute. Again, however, an arbitrator upholding the discharge
might not address himself to the federal questions involved.
The role of stewards in investigating and processing grievances and insuring fidelity to collective agreements has been
recognized by the NLRB and arbitrators as essential to industrial
democracy as well as critical to the proper functioning of private
contract administration.3 5 A union steward may engage in conduct
34. 172 N.L.R.B. No. 201, 69 L.R.R.M. 1081 (1968).
35. See generally Leahy, Arbitration, Union Stewards and Wildcat Strikes, 24 Ann.
J. (n.s.) 50 (1969); Jaffe, The Protected Rights of the Union Steward, 23 IND. &' LAB. R,..
REv. 488 (1970).
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which might normally be considered insubordination. 6 Thus,
stewards may refuse to obey an order regarding his investigation
of an alleged breach of the contract with impunity where the
order interferes with the steward's rights under the agreement.3 7
Moreover, although the reasonableness of the steward's behavior
is relevant, the reasonableness of particular conduct does not
necessarily depend upon express provisions of work rules and
collective agreements.38
More significantly, the interests of the steward and his union
may not be perfectly meshed. Subrosa "amendments" to collective agreements are not unknown and, assuming the union felt
that the employee did lead a walkout, the union may not be highly
motivated to protect the employee. In a case involving a work
stoppage, where discipline is focused on the unauthorized nature
of the walkout, the union's first instinct might be to protect its
treasury and stress the unauthorized nature of the steward's action.
Collusion or indifference is almost impossible to prove and, if the
NLRB will not consider the merits of the employee's charge, the
employee's other avenues of redress will normally prove illusory.
The facts of Eazor demonstrate that these suspicions are not without some foundation.
Under many teamster agreements, grievances are adjudicated
by joint union-employer panels rather than by neutral arbitrators.
Thus, the problems of collusion and "horse trading" are greatly
magnified. As NLRB member Jenkins has recently stated, albeit
in dissent,
Whatever result such a.Committee of the protagonists might
reach, it is in part the product of economic power, adjustment
with an eye to other disputes or differences between them or on
their future bargaining positions, and other considerations unrelated to the merits of the particular claim before the Com39

mittee.

The NLRB has not been totally unaware of this problem, and
has been reluctant to defer in cases where the impartiality of the
36. Jaffe, supra note 35, at 483.
37. See, e.g., H.E. Wiese, Inc., 169 N.L.R.B. No. 145, 67 L.R.R.M. 1533 (1968);
Mead and Mount Const. Co., 169 N.L.R.B. No. 79, 67 L.R.R.M. 1270 (1968); International
Harvester Co., 16 Lab. Arb. 307 (1951).
38. See Metal Blast, Inc. v. NLRB, 324 F.2d 602 (6th Cir. 1963).
39. Terminal Transport Co., 185 N.L.R.B. No. 96, 75 L.R.R.M. 1130 (1970).
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tribunal was dearly in doubt. Thus, a joint area committee's
decision was not accorded deference where the employee had been
a vigorous opponent of the Teamsters' Union and an outspoken
critic of the trucking industry. The Board felt that the members
of the joint board might well have represented common interests
adverse to the grievant. 40 The case suggests, however, that evidence of bias rather than the possibility of unfairness is required
to overcome the NLRB's deference policy.
The grievance in Eazor was first heard by a joint panel in
Cincinnati at which the steward appeared. The committee deadlocked, and the grievance then progressed to the Ohio Joint
Grievance Committee. The employee did not appear because he
had been erroneously informed of the date of this hearing. Nevertheless, the Ohio Committee also deadlocked, and the grievance
was referred pursuant to the agreement to the Central State Joint
Area Committee which met in Chicago. The grievant did not
appear, claiming that he could not afford the trip, a not unlikely
explanation.
The discharge was upheld, indicating that at least some union
representatives agreed with the employer's version of the event.
Such statesmanship may well be applauded, although cynical
observers may have some doubts about the result. 41 Admittedly,
however, the two prior bipartite parties had deadlocked. The
meaning of the prior deadlocks is not necessarily apparent, however, and one would need more data to determine the significance
of these events. Deadlocks at lower levels may simply be caused
by a desire to have higher levels, not directly involved in the dispute, accept responsibility for the decision.
Before the Central Committee the employer and the union
repeated their version of the facts. The employer presented two
employee witnesses who substantiated its version of the facts; the
union, however, presented no witnesses despite the existence of
employees who were willing to testify about the steward's conduct.
40. Roadway Express, Inc., 145 N.L.R.B. 513 (1963). On the merits, however, the
NLRB upheld the discharge.
41. The Board has not always deferred when bipartite boards have adjudicated the
contract issue. See Youngstown Cartage Co., 146 N.L.RB. 305 (1964); Roadway Express,
Inc., 145 N.L.R.B. 513 (1963). Cf. Modem Motor Express, Inc., 149 N.L.R.B. 1507 (1964);
Denver-Chicago Trucking Co., 132 N.L.R.B. 1416 (1961).
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Although a complaint was indeed issued by the General
Counsel, the NLRB decided to defer to the Central Committee's
award. The NLRB found no evidence that the award had been
"tainted by fraud, collusion, unfairness or serious procedural
irregularities," nor was the award "clearly repugnant to the purposes and policies of the Act." The trial examiner, upheld by the
NLRB without opinion, found no reason to believe that the result
would have been different had the steward been present since he
would only have repeated his statements before the Cincinnati
panel, and the Central Committee was aware of the prior proceedings. It is obviously impossible for the trial examiner, however, to know that an "oral answer to an oral question would
[not] have swayed the panel."
Whether or not the grievant is present before the arbitral
tribunal, the NLRB's primary concern is whether his interests
have been "adequately and honestly represented." 42 The union
apparently did present the steward's contention. The examiner
noted that the steward never complained that the union had
unfairly or inadequately represented him, although it is difficult
to see how he could have done so since he was not present. Moreover, the record of the proceeding will usually not reveal the
extent of "adequate and honest" representation, nor will any
unfairness necessarily surface during the trial examiner's hearing.
Minutes of joint committee hearings are generally too terse and
unilluminating to be considered an adequate record of theproceedings. Testimony, cross examination, motions and other critical
components of a trial record usually go unrecorded.
4
Although the employer in Eazor presented two witnessesO3
the union presented none. Given this state of the evidence, even
a neutral arbitrator would have had difficulty in deciding for the
grievant as the union's claims were only claims after all, not evidence. And yet, this evidentiary imbalance was used by the trial
examiner to uphold the award:
Expertise takes many forms, and men familiar with the trucking industry may be as well qualified to judge whether the dock
employees walked out without Ball first giving them the nod,
42. Eazor Express Corp., 172 N.L.R.B. No. 201, 69 L.R.R.M. 1081, 1082 n.7 (1968).
43. An unidentified witness' testimony was read into the record by the employer
but the trial examiner deemed this evidence "merely cumulative." 69 L.R.R.M. at 1083.
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even without looking Ball in the eye, as myself who had the
benefit of observing his demeanor.4 4

The statement leaves one breathless. Expertise is indeed useful, but its usefulness in the absence of facts is doubtful. The trial
examiner permitted the private tribunal to infer that the grievant
led the walkout, apparently without any physical sign or oral
command, despite the protected nature of the steward's inquiry.
The primary problem raised in cases like Eazor is that the
union and management interests might well coincide. Cases in
which union-member conflicts may exist involve problems of
fairness that cannot be satisfactorily resolved simply by paying
scrupulous attention to the extent of procedural due process
afforded in the arbitration proceeding, even assuming NLRB review could adequately gauge the extent of actual unfairness.
Indeed, the Board's due process standards, which set limits to
administrative deference to arbitration, are not exceedingly high.
The NLRB's deference standards were originally set forth in
Spielberg Mfg. Co.: 45 In order to encourage the voluntary settlement of labor disputes the NLRB would defer if (1) arbitration
proceedings "appear to have been fair and regular, (2) all parties
had agreed to be bound, and (3) the decision of the arbitration
panel is not clearly repugnant to the purposes and policies of the
Act."
The first and third standards indicate that an investigation
of the record is required-otherwise the Board would be unable to
determine whether appropriate fairness was accorded and whether
the result was "clearly repugnant" to federal policies. But the
policy favoring "voluntary settlement" is such that no thoroughgoing inquiry is necessary or perhaps even possible. The proceeding must only "appear" to be fair, and the employee faces an
almost insurmountable task in demonstrating that the quality of
representation was below acceptable standards. This is certainly
true when he is not present, and the NLRB does not make his
presence mandatory.4 6 Even if a thorough review was deemed ap44. Id.
45. 112 N.L.R.B. 1080, 1082 (1955).
46. Although neither law nor contract may grant the right of intervention, there
is evidence that arbitrators often attempt to "work something out," e.g., to satisfy an
interventionary demand in a mutually agreeable manner. See Fleming, Some Problems of
Due Process and FairProcedure in Labor Arbitration, 13 STAN. L. REv. 235, 241-42 (1961).
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propriate, the object of such an inquiry is often inadequate.
Minutes of teamster panels, for instance, are often too terse to
make any meaningful inquiry into the fairness of the proceeding.
The reasons for the determination are rarely disclosed, sometimes
even when requested.47 Even in the more normal situation where
a neutral arbitrator is employed, records are rarely made, and
written opinions rarely reflect the quality of representation afforded.
Ironically, an adequate investigation into the fairness of the
arbitration proceeding would unnecessarily divert the NLRB's
resources as this question is unrelated to the merits of the unfair
labor practice charge before it. The more generalized Spielberg
standards, then, make administrative sense to the NLRB. The
Board will defer to private resolution if those procedures were
fair, but, since fairness is not directly related to the substance of
the employee's charge, only a cursory investigation comports with
administrative efficiency and doctrinal wisdom.
The trial examiner in Eazor found no reason to believe that
the proceeding was not fair despite the fact that the result was
"announced without explanation or rationale." The proceeding
may have been fair, but the shoe is on the wrong foot. The possibility of unfairness was present, and there is little reason to place
the risk on the employee. The possibility of discrimination or
unfairness cannot be discounted; surely this is so from a simple
reading of the record.
The Spielberg standards were aimed at foreclosing the possibility that encouragement of private settlement machinery would
sacrifice rights under the NLRA. Given the phrasing and application of these standards, however, the problem would have to be
rephrased-does this encouragement "unduly" sacrifice federal
interests, for arbitral decisions must be "clearly repugnant" to
federal policies to avoid deference. The burden is on the employee
in the first instance, and if a charge is issued, on the General
Counsel.
47. See Denver-Chicago Trucking Co., 132 N.L.R.B. 1416 (1961). In this case the
panel heard and decided thirty cases in two days although the trial examiner's hearing
in one case took five days. See also Terminal Transport Co., 185 N.L.R.B. No. 96, 75
L.R.R.M. 1130 (1970).
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Clearly, when the Spielberg standards are not met, deference
would not aid the policy of recognizing private settlements. Gross
procedural irregularities should not lead to deference since a
court challenge and perhaps a new arbitration proceeding will
involve much delay. No federal policy encourages resort to private
settlement procedures which do not accord minimal due process
protection. Where irregularities are present, but not gross, however, the NLRB's policy of deference represents dubious delegation of federal authority to private arbitrators.
The basic problem is that the Board's procedural standards
are too porous to guarantee that federal rights have been protected in the private proceeding. Eazor is perhaps an outstanding
case, but others could be found. In InternationalHarvester,8 one
of the most well known cases in this area, the employee did not
even receive notice of the arbitration proceeding. Nevertheless,
the NLRB found that "procedural regularity [is] not . . .an end
in itself, but [is] . . . a means of defending substantive interests. '4
But that, of course, is precisely the question. The records of
arbitration proceedings are simply too bare to determine if federally protected interests received their due despite irregularities in
procedures. Procedural defaults, as in InternationalHarvester and
Eazor, at least suggest the possibility of unfairness and, what is of
possibly more concern to the NLRB, may reflect a lack of respect
for federal statutory interests. The burden should not be placed
on the employee, even if he were present at the hearing, since
actual unfairness or a lack of concern over federal rights is often
undemonstrable in a subsequent administrative proceeding.
48. 138 N.L.R.B. 923 (1962).
49. But see Gateway Transportation Co., 187 N.L.R.B. 1763 (1962), where the
Board refused to defer when, under protest, an employee was forced to participate in a
proceeding with only 48 hours notice, union counsel was present but refused to represent
him, and his reasonable request for a continuance was rejected. See also Woodlawn Farm
Dairy Co., 162 N.L.R.B. 48 (1966). Since deference is considered to be a matter of
discretion, the appellate courts are reluctant to overturn the Board's actions. Thus,
in affirming deference in InternationalHarvester, the Seventh Circuit upheld the NLRB,
since no evidence of fraud or collusion was presented. Ramsey v. NLRB, 327 F.2d 784
(7th Cir.), rehearing denied, 379 U.S. 874 (1964).
The applicability of the fair representation doctrine to the quality of the union's
presentation and its duty to investigate the facts surrounding the grievance has not yet
been clearly established although such obligations seem dearly necessary.
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Case III: Some Problems of Resolving Federal
Interests in Private Proceedings
International Harvester represents the third category presented above. The union had pursued a grievance to arbitration
in an attempt to discharge an employee for failing to pay his dues
under a union-security arrangement. The NLRB found that the
employee's interests had been satisfactorily represented by the
employer.50 Although there was evidence that the employer "stubbornly resisted the union's efforts to secure his removal from his
job," there is no guarantee that federal rights were protected. The
Board may have felt, however, that the union security clause was
legal, and the employee apparently admitted his default in dues
payment. The General Counsel, however, was not convinced.
The Board in International Harvester verbally toughened
its standards, perhaps in response to the recent acceptance of
arbitration in the Trilogy. Thus, the Spielberg standards were
revised: the Board will defer in discharge cases "unless it clearly
appears that the arbitration proceedings were tainted by fraud,
collusion, unfairness, or serious procedural irregularities or that
the award was clearly repugnant to the purposes and policies of
the act."" These standards will hardly encourage employees to file
unfair labor practice charges in the context of arbitral awards,
nor will regional offices be motivated to act on the charges that
are filed.
One year after InternationalHarvester, the Board applied its
deference standards to a representation proceeding, holding that
a petition was barred by the contract between the employer and
another union since the arbitrator had interperted that agreement to support the other union's claim. The Board did not
consider significant the fact that the petitioning union had not
been a party to the arbitration proceeding. As in Harvester, the
Board felt that the absent party's case had been adequately presented by the employer. Despite the Supreme -Court's apparent
support of bilateral arbitration in essentially trilateral situa50. Interestingly, a quite important question of federal law was, inextricably involved
in the dispute, i.e., the relationship of Indiana's right-to-work law and section 14(b) of the
NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (1964).
51. International Harvester Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 923, 927 (1962) (emphasis added).
52. Raley's, Inc., 143 N.L.R.B. 256 (1963).
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tions, 53 the Board has recently refused to defer in representation
proceedings because, inter alia, not all parties had participated in
the proceeding.54 This development is sound for, among other
reasons, nonparticipating unions will not consider themselves
bound by bilateral awards, representation by an employer is a
relatively unsatisfying situation, and the arbitrator agreeable to
two of the parties may not be acceptable to the third." In International Harvester the employee did not participate in the arbitration proceeding, nor did he participate in the selection of the
arbitrator. Since federal law provides explicit protection for individual employee interests, the NLRB should not have deferred.
In other tripartite situations, the NLRB has similarly been
solicitous of the "missing" party. The NLRA, for instance, directs the Board to "hear and determine" 56 work assignment disputes which are encompassed by section 8(b)(4)(d)5 7 The filing
of a charge, however, does not lead to the normal section 10
unfair labor practice hearing but, rather, to a section 10(k) proceeding. This section 10(k) proceeding, basically an arbitration
proceeding to determine which group of employees should be
assigned the disputed work,5 8 will not be held if the "parties to
such a dispute submit to the Board satisfactory evidence that they
have adjusted, or agreed upon methods for the voluntary adjustment of, the dispute." 9 The NLRB has consistently interpreted
"parties" to include the employer as well as the two
0
unions.1
The result is to bypass industrial arbitration panels, such as the
National Joint Board in the construction industry, as well as interunion arbitration procedures, where the employer has not agreed
53. Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261 (1964).
54. Hotel Employers Ass'n of San Francisco, 159 N.L.R.B. 143 (1966); Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 162 N.L.R.B. 768 (1967).
55. See Peck, supra note 29, at 144.
56. LMRA § 10 (k), 61 Stat. 149 (1947) 29 U.S.C. § 160 (k) (1958).
57. LMRA § 8(b)(4)(D), 61 Stat. 142 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158
(b)(4)(D) (Supp. V., 1964).
58. See NLRB v. Radio and Television Broadcast Engineers, 364 U.S. 573 (1961).
59. LMRA § 10(k), 61 Stat. 149 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(k) (1958).
60. See generally Atleson, The NLRB and JurisdictionalDisputes: The Aftermath
of CBS, 53 GEo. L.J. 93, 110-12 (1964); O'Donoghue, JurisdictionalDisputes in the
Con.
struction Industry Since CBS, 52 Gao. L.J. 314, 332 (1964). The District of Columbia
Court of Appeals has recently held that the employer is not a "party" under § 10(k).
Plasterers Local 79 v. NLRB, 74 L.R.R.M. 2575 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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to be bound. Similarly, the NLRB has generally refused to defer
to bilateral arbitral award, Joint Board determinations, or interunion agreements when it has reached the merits of the work
assignment dispute."The author has argued elsewhere that these policies do not
follow from the underlying policies of section 10(k), namely, the
settlement of jurisdictional disputes and the encouragement of
private settlement machinery. 2 It is significant to note here, however, that the NLRB has steadfastly stressed the value of participation of all interested parties in arbitration proceedings before
deference can be accorded. Admittedly, the arbitral discharge
situation is not strictly analogous, but there are sufficient similarities to suggest that the NLRB should be more sensitive to the
unsuccessful grievant's unfair labor practice charge. Indeed, the
interest is not so much that the "dispute" be "settled," and preferably privately, but that public rights be protected. Sections 8(a)(1)
and (3) grant rights to employees which are independent of arbitral settlements, and the NLRB should clearly be wary of deferring in cases in which the employee was not even present at the
arbitral hearing. Thus, a serious objection to a broad policy of
deference is the potential unfairness in the arbitration procedure
itself.(3
Even though the employee is present, however, his federal
rights may not have been protected due to the structure and the
context of arbitration proceedings. This is, perhaps, the core
problem with the NLRB's deference policy. In some discharge
cases, the interests of the parties who have chosen the arbitrator
and from whom he receives his remuneration may be mutual
and in conflict with the interests of the grievant, and this configuration of interests may not be revealed by the Spielberg standards.
61. Atleson, supra note 60 at 129-39.
62. Id. at 110-12, 129-39.
63. The institutional deficiencies of arbitration in protecting non-contractual federal
rights has been thoughtfully stated by Professor Gould. See Gould, Labor Arbitration of
Grievances Involving Racial Discrimination,118 U. PA. L. REv. 40, 46-52 (1969). He notes
that arbitration provides a less than satisfactory settlement procedure when those who are
alleged to have discriminated have control of the grievance system. The arbitrator,
although impartial as far as the parties are concerned, may be expected to be at least
psychologically affected by the interests of the parties who have retained him. The problem
is no different when the grievant is white, but he claims union discrimination under the

NLRA or his complaint indicates that his interest might be in conflict with the institutional interests of the contractual parties.
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Where the grievant is considered a "troublemaker" by both parties,
or a dissenter by the union, the arbitrator may not be unduly solicitous of the employee's claim." In referring to the arbitrator's role,
Justice Douglas stated in Warriorand Gulf: 5
The labor arbitrator is usually chosen because of the parties'
confidence in his knowledge of the common law of the shop and
their trust in his personal judgment to bring to bear considerations
which are not expressed in the contract as criteria for judgment.
The parties expect that his judgment of a particular grievance
will reflect not only what the contract says but, insofar as the
collective agreement permits, such factors as the effect upon
productivity of a particular result, its consequences to the morale
of the shop, his judgment whether tensions will be heightened or
diminished.e6

Such criteria may not substantially undercut the adjudicatory
nature of arbitration, 6 7 but they do stress the interests of the formal
parties to the collective agreement.
The Spielberg requirement that the arbitration procedure
be fair was designed to avoid this possibility. In practice, however, subtle unfairness is difficult to prove, and the Board in fact
requires gross irregularity. In addition, especially since the
grievant need not be present for deference purposes, challenges to
the quality of presentation are well nigh impossible.08 Even if the
grievant is present, the union generally controls the presentation
of his case.
As Professor Fleming has pointed out,6 due process standards
are applied with greater informality in arbitration proceedings.
Thus, most arbitrators readily admit hearsay,70 some arbitrators
may not permit employees to confront or cross-examine wit64. See P. HAYs, LABOR ARBITRATION 37-75 (1966); Comment, The NLRB and
Deference to Arbitration, 77 YALE L.J. 1191, 1195 (1968).
65. 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
66. Id. at 582.
67. P. SELZNICr, LAv, SOCIETY AND INDUSrRIAL JUsTIcE 160-62 (1969).
68. Although the grievant need not be present at the arbitration proceeding, the
NLRB will not defer if the grievant's counsel is present but denied the right of participation. Honolulu-Star Bulletin, Ltd., 123 N.L.R.B. 395 (1959). See also Star Expansion
Ind. Corp., 164 N.L.R.B. 563 (1967); International Harvester Co., 16 Lab. Arb. 307
(1957).
69. R. FLEMING, THE LABOR ARBITRATION PROCESS 196-98 (1967).
70. Id. at 179. See also Fleming, supra note 46, at 246-48.
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nesses,7 1 may take into consideration a refusal to testify,72 may
accept evidence unlawfully obtained, 73 and may treat evidence of
prior misconduct as relevant to the question of guilt.74 It is insufficient to recognize that these practices are accepted or condoned by the parties. This degree of informality may well be
practical and efficient, but the NLRB need not bow to efficient,
but doubtful, procedures when federal rights are at stake. The
"flexibility" of arbitration proceedings is disturbing when the
interests of the parties who have created the procedure have interests which potentially conflict with those of the grievant.
Even the satisfaction of procedural due process does not
guarantee that fairness was accorded, that the employee was
adequately represented or that federal rights were adequately protected by the arbitrator. The settlement may be based upon
factors which do not relate to the merits. Thus, the possibility that
grievances may be bargained or "horse-traded" cannot be discounted.
Gases in which the parties act in collusion are not unknown."
The common denominator in "rigged" cases, or "informed"
awards, is that those affected by the award will not know that the
arbitrator has been apprised of the result which the parties
prefer.7 Moreover, it is unlikely that this knowledge will be
communicated to the NLRB.
Of course, other, non-substantive pressures may be at work
arbitral process. Settlements may represent sympathetic
the
on
surrenders because the representative of one party realizes that
77
the system will not work unless each side has some victories.
Indeed, the fact that a union takes a case to arbitration may only
demonstrate the political recognition that it is better to blame
the arbitrator for a loss than to screen out the grievance initially.
71.

R. FLEMING, supra note 69, at 175-81.

72.

Id. at 181-86.

73. Id. at 186-97.
74. Id. at 166-70. Many arbitrators will admit this type of evidence and give it
weight when the charged offense has a "functional relationship" to the past offense. See
generally Wirtz, Due Process of Arbitration, in TIE ARBrrATORS AND THE PARTIES 1, 18
(McKelvey ed. 1958).
75. See Seitz, Two Faces of Arbitration: Which Book Do You Read?, 19 STAN. L. REv.
698 (1967) ; Stackman, Now, Who Shall Arbitrate?, 19 STAN. L. Rlv. 707 (1967).
76. Fleming, supra note 46, at 248-49.
77. R. FLEMING, supra note 69, at 20-21.
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The basic concern here is not that arbitratorswill intentionally reject individual interests in favor of collective or institutional interests, but, rather, that the arbitrator'sperceived role
will inherently and even unconsciously bias his decision. 8 Willard
Wirtz has testified to the recognition of this process while serving
as an arbitrator:
I realized that I wasn't listening to what the grievant was saying
because it had already become obvious that an award of reinstate-

ment without back pay would be "acceptable" to both the com79
pany and the union.

Since the parties make the rules, the arbitrator is interested in
reaching an "acceptable" result. Professor Wirtz's paper raises
questions about the protection of individual rights in arbitration
proceedings and notes the extent to which arbitrators' attitudes
may have "been too strongly influenced by the comparative safety
and easiness of going along with the parties." 80
Arbitrators admit that "rigged" or "agreed" cases "Iexist and
that bargaining and "horse trading" often occurs during arbitration. Indeed the National Association of Arbitrator's Code of
Ethics recognizes some forms of this practice s Some arbitrators
feel that arbitrators should "avert [their] eyes from such shameful,
but occasionally highly utilitarian, performances."

83

The rigged

case is not merely a settlement of the grievance, for the parties
78. Arbitrators have adopted some due process standards. In Thrifty Drug Stores,
for instance, 50 Lab. Arb. 1253 (1968), the arbitrator upheld the rights of suspected em-

ployees to the assistance of a union representative at a company interrogation and the
right to remain silent when accused of conduct constituting a crime. See also Texaco
Inc., 168 N.L.R.B. No. 49, 66 L.R.R.M. 1296 (1967). See Silard, Rights of the Accused
Employee in Company Disciplinary Investigations, 22ND ANNUAL N.Y.U. CONFERENCE ON
LABOR 217 (1970).
In the absence of a clear plant rule requiring a suspected employee to disclose the
contents of his pickets, a discharge for refusing such an order was held unauthorized.
Scott Paper Co., 52 Lab. Arb. 57 (1969).
79. Wirtz, Due Process of Arbitration, in THE ARBITRATOR AND TiE PARTIES 1 (1958).
80. Id. at 26.
81. See Fuller, Collective Bargaining and the Arbitrator, 1963 WIs. L. REv. 3, 18-22;
Epstein, The Agreed Case: A Problem in Ethics, 20 ARn. L.J. 41 (1965); American Arbitration Association, Code of Ethics for Labor-Management Arbitration, Part II, Section 5(c),
Part III, Section 10, reproduced in 15 Lab. Arb. 961, 964-66 (1951) ; Wirtz, supra note 74,
at 17, 26-32; Levitt, PracticalProblems in the Handling of Grievances and Labor Arbitration, 3 GA. L. Rnv. 411, 418 (1969).

82. American Arbitration Association, supra note 81, in 15 Lab. Arb. at 964-66.
83. Seitz, The Enforcement of Collective Bargaining Contracts by Arbitration, in
SIxTH ANNUAL N.Y.U. CONFERENCE ON LABOR 15, 20 (1953). But see Epstein, supra note 81;
Wirtz, supra note 74.
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wish the arbitrator to issue as his award the agreement reached by
the parties. Most seriously, "[s]ince the negotiators insist that their
agreement be kept a secret from their principals, there is no guarantee that the agreement was not improperly arrived at." 84
Whether "rigged" or not, it should be clear that the possibility of unfairness is always present but may be impossible to
prove. This problem is most serious in discharge cases where the
union may take a case to arbitration for political reasons, although
they feel the grievance is without merit, the grievant is unworthy
of protection, or on balance other collective or institutional interests outweigh the recognized merit of the grievance.
The union's conduct during the proceeding, that is, the
quality or absence of its presentation, may indicate to the arbitrator
its indifference to the grievance. When the union makes a presentation, however, and it is inadequate, it is difficult for an arbitrator
to alter the hearing even if he suspects that the union is "pulling
its punches." The arbitrator,after all, is a creature of the parties,
and severe limitations exist on his ability to exceed the expectations of his creators. NLRB review, however, will normally not
reveal these problems.
Professor Wirtz' reaction to the most extreme variety of
"rigged" cases-the arbitrator promises in advance to uphold a
discharge after a sham arbitral proceeding-indicates a partial
theme of this article:
It may be pure prudishness. I would like to think it rather a
concern that even if justice-blindfolded here in the very image of
the statute-is served in every one of these individual cases, they
nevertheless will have weakened the structure of confidence on
which the whole institution of arbitration essentially is based.8 5
Thus, in sum, one basic objection to a broad policy of deference is that the Board's deference standards are too loose to uncover
unfairness or inadequate representation in the arbitration proceeding. Arbitrators, whether consciously or not, are understandably affected by the interests of the parties and interested in reach-

ing an "acceptable" solution. In addition, their freedom to maneuver is limited by the parties, and their decision will normally
be based on the presentations made at the hearing.
84.
85.

Epstein, supra note 81, at 44.
Wirtz, supra note 74, at 27.
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The second basic objection to NLRB deference in discharge
cases is the possibility that federal policy will not be satisfied. Two
of the NLRB's deference standards, the absence of fraud or collusion and the requirement that all parties be bound by the private
settlement, are generally required to uphold the arbitrator's award
on appeal. The unique requirement, then, is that the award not be
at variance with federal law. Since a full scale review would be
required to decide this question, and the NLRB uses deference in
part to reduce its workload, the probable meaning is that the
Board is concerned only with awards grossly inconsistent with
federal law where such a variance can be determined without a
full scale investigation.
The protection of employees from unlawful discharges is a
critical policy of federal labor law. Unlike 8(a)(5) cases where the
federal policies of free collective bargaining under the NLRA and
section 301 can mesh, an independent employee interest is at stake
in discharge cases. Arbitration in this kind of case is not an appropriate forum for the resolution of federal rights. First, the arbitrator's role is to ascertain the intent of the parties-an intent which
may not coincide with the NLRA. Moreover, although many arbitrators will interpret an agreement to comply with federal law,
many arbitrators will only use federal law as an interpretive tool,
feeling that the NLRB is the appropriate forum for the satisfaction
of federal wrongs. Arbitrators have long been divided as to the
extent to which it is proper to consider statutory policies in interpreting agreements.86 In any event, since many arbitrators are
not attorneys, their industrial expertise does not necessarily assist
their statutory interpretation.87
The possibility that federal interests will be sacrificed can be
demonstrated by two recent cases. In one case an arbitrator did
consider federal law and found that the employee had been discharged for engaging in protected activities. The arbitrator
awarded back pay but not reinstatement since the agreement provided that the employer could not be coerced to reinstate the
86. See generally THE ARBITRATOR, THE NLRB AND THE COURTS, 47-228 (Jones ed.
1967).
87. See Fleming, Survey of Arbitration in 1962, in LABOR AmITRATION: PERSPEarivES
AND PROBLEMS 304 (Kahn ed. 1964). A 1962 study found that only 87 of the 175 arbitrators
responding had a law degree.
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employee. The Board deferred."" Thus, an award dearly based
upon a violation of the NLRA was not reviewed despite the fact
that the arbitrator could not contractually provide the normal
remedy for such a violation. The arbitrator had indeed faced and
decided the federal question, and the Board may even have approved his interpretation of federal law, yet delegation in this
case denied the employee the critical right of reinstatement.
In Terminal Transport Co. 9 a joint teamster-employer committee was presented with an employee's claim that he was discharged for protected activity. The employer claimed the employee
was unqualified to perform his assigned work. The employee had
filed a grievance on September 11 alleging that a supervisor had
performed unit work. Previously, on September 2, a supervisor
had urged him to withdraw the grievance. Subsequent to the filing
of the grievance, on September 12 and 13, the employee received
warning notices and on September 16 he was discharged. The
supervisor's request and the timing of the notices indicate at least
a prima facie case of discrimination, convincing both the General
Counsel and the trial examiner. Indeed, the grievance was settled,
and the grievant was paid for the lost work on September 21.
The joint committee gave no indication that the discrimination issue was considered or settled. Instead, the committee decided
that the employee should take a performance test, the outcome of
the test to determine the ultimate resolution of the grievance.
The NLRB rejected the trial examiner's finding that the act
was violated, holding that the agency should defer to the arbitral
award. The decision is simply outrageous. The problem here is
not the lack of a neutral arbitrator but that the federal question
was either not decided or decided inconsistently with existing law.
Whether or not the employee can pass a performance test does
not determine the federal issue. The question is not whether the
employee can pass the performance test nor is it whether the employer had a good reason to discharge the employee. The question
is one of discrimination, which may exist simultaneously with a
"good" reason to discharge. With no arbitral "award" the NLRB
would have considered whether the employer's justification for the
discharge was a mere pretext.
88.
89.

Howard Electric Co., 166 N.L.R.B. 338 (1967).
185 N.L.R.B. No. 96, 75 L.R.R.M. 1130 (1970).
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Both cases demonstrate that the Board's deference guidelines
do not guarantee protection of federal interests. To the contrary
both decisions permit results which may be inconsistent with
federal law.
THE EMPLOYEE'S ALTERNATIVE AVENUES OF RELIEF:
DEFERENCE IN PERSPECTIVE

The union's failure to forcefully and fairly represent the
grievant at the arbitration hearing could also be the subject of a
fair representation action in court. Yet, if the employee cannot
demonstrate a lack of diligence on the union's part to the NLRB's
satisfaction, he will definitely have no more success before the judicial tribunal. Both Spielberg and fair representation doctrines
defer to the institutional interests in arbitration procedures and it
is difficult for an employee to challenge an award under section
301, under fair representation, or to try to avoid the award in an
unfair labor practice proceeding. *Thus, the NLRB's policy of
deference in discharge cases may foreclose any meaningful and
impartial review of the merits.
A brief consideration of the evolving law of fair representation and contract administration will reveal the great weight placed
upon institutional concerns. These restrictions on protection of
individual claims places the NLRB's policy of deference in perspective. A convenient beginning point involves a possible area
of overlap-the right of the employee-grievant to be present at the
arbitration proceeding.
The employee in Eazor did not play a role in the choice of
the arbitrator, and he may not have been present at the hearing.
The NLRB's deference standards, however, do not require the
grievant to be present" and the relevant federal law of contract
administration fair representation is at least unclear.
In Humphrey v. Moore,0 ' involving breach of contract and
fair representation claims, the Supreme Court considered the plaintiff-grievant's claim that an arbitration proceeding should be held
invalid because they had not been granted the right to participate
in the proceeding. The Court faced the issue squarely, finding that
the employees had notice of the proceedings and, indeed, three
stewards representing them were present.2 The Court's handling
of the issue suggests that intervention may be protected under the
doctrine of fair representation.
90.
91.
92.

International Harvester Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 923 (1962).
375 U.S. 335 (1964).
Id. at 349.
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The Fifth Circuit, however, in Acuff v. United Paperworkers,
has recently held that absent evidence of bad faith by the union,
wildcat strikers have no right to separate representation in the
arbitration process. 93 The A cuff decision may be inconsistent with
Humphrey v. Moore, and it is not compelled by Vaca v. Sipes."
The latter case gave the union wide discretion in determining
which grievances go to arbitration, but it did not discuss the scope
of procedural due process involved in an actual arbitration proceeding.
The unwillingness of some courts to permit employees to
intervene in arbitration proceedings, 95 even when the subject of
the proceeding is their own grievance, is based on the same concerns which underlie arbitral deference by the NLRB. The fear
is that intervention or NLRB action would weaken the arbitration
system, perhaps increase costs, and destroy "the employer's confidence in the union's authority." 9 The resultant indifference to the
plight of employees is no where made clearer than in cases like
Acuff and Eazor. Assuming that an unauthorized stoppage of work
occurred, the union's primary concern is to protect its treasury
from damages for breach of a no-strike clause and attempt to mitigate any embarassment it might have suffered. Although a union
may defend the employee and seek mitigation of any penalty, its
support will no doubt be lukewarm. In addition, as Professor
Gould has stated, "a perusal of the hearing transcript (if one is
kept) can rarely inform a court on the enthusiasm with which the
union presented the case. . . . Moreover, if unfairness occurred,
the employee's chance of raising this in a judicial tribunal is
fraught with difficulty. Employees may accept the award, but perhaps only because they are aware of the difficulties and the cost of
litigation. Finally, the law's vagueness will not motivate employees'
attorneys to attempt such challenges.
Unions and employers view collective bargaining and arbitration as desirable devices for the settlement of labor disputes. Private resolution is desired, and the parties to an agreement normally
"7

93. 404 F.2d 169 (5th Cir. 1968). For criticism of this decision, see Gould, Racial
Equality in jobs and Unions, Collective Bargaining, and the Burger Court, 68 MiCH. L.
REv. 237, 246-47 (1969); Gould, Labor Arbitration of Grievances Involving Racial Discrimination, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 40, 60-62 (1969).
94. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
95. See also In re Soto, 7 N.Y.2d 397, 165 N.E.2d 885, 198 N.Y.S.2d 282 (1960). But
see Clark v. Hein-Werner Corp., 8 Wis. 2d 264, 99 N.W.2d 132 (1960).
96. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
97. Gould, supra note 93, at 62.
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control the arbitration procedure. Such control extends beyond
the fact that arbitration is the creature of the parties, for the law
has further enhanced the parties' control as well as the importance
of the arbitrator vis-a-vis the courts. Exhaustion of the grievance
procedure, for example, had become a precondition to judicial
action under section 301. 1
Control over the grievance machinery was further enhanced
by Vaca v. Sipes"0 in which individual employee interests were
unduly curtailed because of institutional concerns. 100 Faced with an
employee's state court suit protesting the union's decision not to
take the grievance to ultimate arbitration, the Court was confronted
with the question of possible NLRB preemption and a definition
of the scope of fair representation. In an opinion the prime importance of which lies in its gratuitous dicta, the Court ruled that
neither NLRA section 9 (a) nor section 301 gave the employee
an absolute right to invoke the grievance arbitration procedure. 101
Such a right, therefore, could only be found in the collective
agreement.0 2 Moreover, if the union refused to process the grievance, a breach of contract action may lie against the employer,
but only if the union's refusal to employ contractual remedies was
wrongful. 0 3 Thus, the employee must prove a breach of the
union's obligation to fairly represent him by its refusal to arbitrate his grievance in order to reach the merits of the contractual
claim against the employer. Why an attempt by the employee to
exhaust his contractual remedies was not sufficient was not explained, but presumably the Court's policy of deference to institutional arrangements explains this step in its reasoning. The fair
representation issue may often be more difficult to establish than
the employer's breach of contract although the latter is the real
object of the employee's action. The union, for instance, could
not satisfy an employee's interest in reinstatement. The successful
hurtling of the fair representation barrier does permit the court
98.

Republic Steel v. Maddoz, 379 U.S. 650 (1965).

99. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
100. See generally Lewis, Fair Representation in Grievance Administration, Vaca v.
Sipes, 1967 Sup. CT. REv. 81.
101. For a thoughtful and compelling view in opposition, see Summers, Individual
Rights in Collective Agreements and Arbitration, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 362 (1962).
102. Although data is not available it may be safe to presume that few agreements
give individual employees the right to invoke the arbitration process.
103. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. at 186-87.
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to face the contract issue, but that is all. ,The Supreme Court has
made it clear that although the union's arbitrary action is a prerequisite to the contract claim, the union can only be liable for
damages in excess of those caused by the employer. 10 4 Ironically,
then, proof of a statutory violation is required to prove a contract
breach, but no damages will normally flow from the violation.
In addition, Vaca defined the scope of unfair representation
to cover only arbitrary or bad faith conduct on the part of the
union. It was insufficient that a state court had found the employee's discharge wrongful, for the proper test was not the merit
of the grievance, but, rather, the union's good faith belief in its
lack of merit.
Thus, federal law gives the employee no right to invoke the
grievance procedure and, if the union refused to employ this
procedure, the employee's contractual claim receives judicial scrutiny only if the union's refusal to act was wrongful. The employee's good faith attempt to urge his union to act, as well as the
actual merit of his claim, is irrelevant. Moreover, if the case does
proceed to arbitration and is decided on the merits, the developing law of section 301 makes it extremely difficult to overturn the
arbitrator's decision, 10 5 and the NLRB is likely to defer to the
arbitrator's resolution of the dispute. The entire structure is ideal
104. Id. at 196-98. This holding, of course, relates only to cases in which the union
did not induce the employer to act. Joint liability would be proper if collusion could be
demonstrated in relation to either the contract breach or the breach of the fair representation obligation.
105. Courts must enforce arbitral awards so long as the award "draws its essence
from the collective bargaining agreement .. " or does not "manifest an infidelity to this
obligation." United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp., 363
U.S. 593, 597 (1960). The burden placed on the challenger is sufficiently great to deter
many challenges, or if not, to predict failure. For discussions on the appropriate scope of
judicial review, see Meltzer, Ruminations About Ideology, Law and Labor Arbitration, 34
U. Cnr. L. Rv. 545 (1967) ; Christensen, Labor Arbitration and Judicial Oversight, 19
STAN. L. REv. 671 (1967); Aaron, Judicial Intervention in Labor Arbitration, 20 STAN.
L. REv. 41 (1967).
The difficulty of overturning awards argues for a revision of the NLRB's deference
policy. An award, although seemingly proper and paying due obeisance to contractual
language, is virtually impregnable.
Working in this area is particularly frustrating. What does one say to the longservice employee whose discharge has been upheld in arbitration over a matter that
would be considered minor by most arbitrators? Counsel may suspect that the employee's
recent expulsion from the union was relevant (and the "acceptability" of the discharge
may have ironically been communicated to the arbitrator by the grievant's use of independent counsel), but what can be done?
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from the standpoint of institutional interests, but the result may
well be the employee's inability to have his claim determined by
an entirely neutral tribunal or, indeed, any tribunal at all.
Ironically, one of the reasons why NLRB preemption of fair
representation cases was rejected in Vaca was the recognition that
the General Counsel has "unreviewable discretion to refuse to
institute an unfair labor practice complaint."' 10 The employee,
therefore, "could no longer be assured of impartial review of his
complaint. . ..
As Justice Black perceptively noted: "[T]he
Court today opens slightly the courthouse door to an employee's
incidental claim against his union for breach of its duty of fair
representation, only to shut it in his face when he seeks direct
judicial relief for his underlying and more valuable breach-ofcontract claim against his employer."' 08 Since it is extremely difficult to challenge arbitral awards when the grievance system
is exhausted, the NLRB should reevaluate its policy of deferring
these awards.
The relationship of the NLRB to arbitration is different
than that of the courts, and the deference given to arbitral awards
under section 301 does not necessarily apply to the protection of
statutory rights. Section 10(a), for instance, expressly provides
that NLRB jurisdiction is not affected by private settlement procedures, and the Supreme Court has recognized the NLRB's special role when charges relate to conduct which could violate both
the NLRA and the contract. 10 The NLRB's voluntary deference
to arbitral decisions, however, at least in so far as discharge cases
are concerned, places the Board in a position roughly analogous
to the courts. Such an approach unduly sacrifices federal rights
to private settlement machinery. Judicial deference in arbitral
matters, after all, does not involve the surrender of independent,
substantive rights. Although the Spielberg standards are helpful,
their generality and applicability to only gross irregularities provide little solace to the injured employer. Similarly, the employee's opportunity to challenge the employer's actions under
"107

106. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182 (1967).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 203 (Justice Black, dissenting).
109. See NLRB v. C & C Plywood Corp., 385 U.S. 421 (1967); NLRB v. Acme
Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432 (1967).
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section 301 involves the doctrine of fair representation which can
be criticized on similar grounds. The inability of an employee to
challenge an arbitral award or his union's representation of his
grievance makes the NLRB's policy of deference even more critical.
UNILATERAL ACTION AND DISCHARGE CASES:

THE BOARD'S CONTRASTING POLICIES

The Board's action in discharge cases is to be contrasted with
the common refusal to defer in cases involving unilateral action
by employers during the life of an agreement. In these cases, the
scope of the employer's obligation to bargain under 8(a)(5) is
narrowed by the terms of the agreement, for there is no duty to
bargain over a "modification" of an existing agreement under
NLRA section 8(d). A unilateral change in working conditions,
however, violates the obligation to bargain in good faith, but the
right to alter working conditions can be granted in the agreement.
The statutory issue, therefore, is whether the employer has unilaterally altered a term of employment in violation of the act or
merely acted in accordance with the parties' agreement. Thus, the
statutory question is inextricably intertwined with the agreement's
construction. The Board's refusal to defer in these cases is dearly
related to the merits as the result is to ignore the award and, normally, to find a statutory violation. The result is a serious invasion
of the policy of encouraging the voluntary settlement of disputes,
and this is especially so since no independent federal concern may
be involved.
The basic problem stems from the differing perspectives of
arbitrators and the Board. NLRB doctrine states that the duty to
bargain continues unless the matter is expressly encompassed
within the agreement 110 or has been dearly and unmistakeably
waived."' Thus, the Board will find an employer's action "unilateral" and, hence, violative of section 8 (a)(5), unless his power to
act is expressly set forth in the collective agreement. The Board's
search for the "intent of the parties" is undertaken with blinders,
and the result is to expand the duty to bargain at the expense of
110.

Jacobs Mfg. Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 1214 (1951).

I1.

Beacon Piece Dyeing and Finishing Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 953 (1958).
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the actual "bargain." It follows, then, that an arbitral award
which upholds the employer's act upon an implied understanding
does not answer the question posed by the NLRB.
The Board's aproach has been justly criticized as portraying
an unrealistic view of the bargaining process. The "bargain"
reached includes more than the written accord, either because of
strategic or tactical reasons or simply because the parties assume
that existing terms and conditions of employment will continue.112 In addition, the NLRB's approach ignores the extent to
which past practice and implied obligations restrict managerial
freedom, 113 and the Supreme Court's Trilogy recognized that implied obligations and unwritten contract terms were within the
scope of proper arbitral jurisdiction. The Board's approach, however, may give a party what he has been denied in practice and
negotiation. Although there is admittedly a difference between
discovering contractual limits on managerial authority and obliging the employer to bargain before he acts, the obligation to bargain is far preferable to a union than an arbitral ruling that the
employer has the contractual authority to act without negotiation
at all.
Obviously the roles of the two tribunals are not the same.
The arbitrator is concerned with the intent of the parties. Federal
law is relevant as an interpretive tool, although arbitrators are
no doubt concerned that their discovery of intent not violate
statutory restrictions. 1 4 The Board, however, is primarily concerned with expanding collective bargaining and less with the
construction of the agreement reached by the parties. Yet, the
Board need not review the merits of an arbitrator's award that
the union waived or traded its right to bargain over a specific
mandatory term. Board review merely undercuts the private settlement machinery by encouraging resort to the Board when an
arbitral award is unsatisfactory. Such forum shopping is a serious
threat in this context since the doctrinal basis for the intent of
the parties is so different. Presumably, statutory violations will
112. See Peck, supra note 29, at 152-53; Jones, The Name of the Game Is Decision Some Reflections on "Arbitrability" and "Authority" in Labor Arbitration, 46 TEXAS
L. R.Ey. 865, 885-96 (1968).
113. See, e.g., Dash, The Arbitration of Subcontracting Disputes, 16 IND. 9. LAD.
REL. R1 . 208 (1963).
114. Jones, supra note 112, at 888.
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generally be resolved by arbitration in refusal to bargain cases,
and there is little need for the Board to intervene in those cases in
which they are not. Unlike employee discharges, no independent
and substantial federal concern is present, for arbitration is part
of the collective bargaining process recognized in section 8(a)(5)
and section 8(b)(3).
The Supreme Court's approach in Fibreboard15 could be
turned on its head-since arbitrators routinely decide cases of
alleged unilateral action, and often imply limitations on managerial authority, industrial practice demonstrates that private
procedures can resolve these disputes. If an implied limitation is
found, of course, the issue is settled. If no such limitation is
found, and the arbitrator finds that the employer has contractual
authority to act, there is no need for the Board to enforce the
obligation to bargain in spite of the parties' intent.
The Board's policy can only be explained by an over-whelming desire to encourage bargaining under section 8(a)(5), as distinct from grievance arbitration. This can hardly explain, however,
the Board's relative lack of concern over 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) rights
in discharge cases. The explanation, therefore, must lie elsewhere
than the common refrain that the Act aims at "encouraging the
practice and procedure of collective bargaining," that "approval
of the arbitral technique . . . [is an] effective and expeditious

means of resolving labor disputes," that the Board should give
"hospitable acceptance to the arbitral process," and that the
"parties [should not be permitted] to bypass their specially devised
grievance-arbitration machinery." Since union security clauses,
restrictions on the employer's power to fire, and implied or express limitations on the employer's power to alter terms and
conditions of employment are all parts of the agreement, the
Board cannot distinguish these cases on the ground that the parties had agreed to settle only some of these disputes by arbitration.
The NLRB's concern that its view of the obligation to bargain
in good faith not be undercut by arbitration should, therefore,
be contrasted with the extent to which the NLRB will permit
more serious interferences with federal policy in discharge cases.
The Board .not only "delegates" the resolution of federal rights
115.

379 U.S. 203 (1964).
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to an arbitrator, but, viewing itself as a court reviewing the
award, refuses to "substitute its judgment for the arbitrator's."",
Unlike cases in which courts review the arbitrator's interpretation of the private agreement, the NLRB's function is to protect
federal interests rather than to "review" the award. A recent case
demonstrates the Board's approach, raising many of the objections raised earlier.
In McLean Trucking Co., 11 7 like Eazor Express, employees

allegedly engaged in an unauthorized walkout. The Central States
Joint Area Committee upheld the discharges of some of the
strikers. The General Counsel argued that the dischargees had
refused to cross a picket line, although the picket line might be
unprotected by federal law, and the joint committee had failed
to consider the employee's alleged statutory and contractual right
to refuse to cross a picket line.
In addition, the General Counsel alleged that the proceedings failed to meet the Board's procedural standards in that (1)
there was no written decision stating reasons for the Committee's
actions, (2) there was no sworn testimony, (3) the employer's case
was presented by its attorney but this right was denied the individual grievants, and (4) both the union and the employer officially took the position that the walkout was unauthorized. In this
situation, the General Counsel argued, the impartiality of the
panel must be doubted.
The trial examiner, whose opinion was generally upheld by
the NLRB, brushed aside these arguments, noting that the procedure followed was traditional and no variations from past practice occurred. In other words, the examiner refused to meet the
General Counsel's arguments head on. Institutional efficiency and
the observance of traditional procedure is, apparently, sufficient
proof that procedural due process was accorded to employees
whose interests might conflict with those of both of the parties.
The examiner was convinced, however, that the union had represented the grievants adequately." 8 The sincerity of the union's
116. See, e.g., Terminal Transport Co., 185 N.L.R.B. No. 96, 75 LR.R.M. 1180

(1970).
117. 175 N.L.R.B. No. 66, 71 L.R.R.M. 1051 (1969). See also W.R. Grace & Co., 179
N.L.R.B. No. 81, 72 L.R.R.M. 1455 (1969).
118. He did find, however, that no request for independent counsel was made.
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representation was found in the fact that the grievances were
"deadlocked" in the lower steps of the grievance structure. Surely,
however, there may be structural or other reasons for the failure
to resolve these issues on lower levels.
The allegation that federally protected activity was not considered was also rejected because the union had presented the section
7 argument before the joint tribunal. Unaccountably, mere
presentationof these issues was sufficient to protect federal interests
although since no opinion was written and no reasons for decision
given, we can only surmise that the reliance on federal law was
found misguided. Why presentation alone should be sufficient to
foreclose further inquiry into these issues by the agency established to interpret and enforce federal law is unclear unless the
examiner was convinced that no federal rights were indeed infringed. If the latter is the case, then veracity would be the better
part of discretion, for the policy of deferring to private settlements
would have been a mere facade. The examiner stated that his decision could not be read to indicate that he would decide the merits
the same way, but he could not "substitute" his judgment for that
of the joint committee.
The NLRB upheld the examiner except as to one employee
whose case had not yet been fully arbitrated. Following its normal
practice, the Board refused to defer to the existence of settlement
machinery in relation to this employee. 19 On the merits, the
NLRB found that the employees' refusal to cross an unauthorized
picket line was unprotected and, thus, discharge was appropriate.2 0
Given the interests asserted for the Board's deference policy,
the justification for the refusal to defer when arbitration procedures
are available is not clear.' 21 The Board often states that when the
119. See'Producers Grain Corp., 169 N.L.R.B. No. 68, 67 L.R.R.M. 1247 (1968);
Hoerner-Waldorf Paper Products Co., 163 N.L.R.B. 772 (1967).
120. The general counsel argued that since the contract had terminated, the "nostrike" clause was no longer in effect. The employees may have acted out of a good
faith belief that the contract did not bar their actions and that federal law protected
their strike activity. The NLRB, however, found that the contract remained in effect until

modifications were agreed upon. Thus, the employees acted at their peril.
121. NLRB member Brown has repeatedly urged that the Board defer until arbitration procedures have been exhausted. See, e.g., Eastern Ill. Gas & Sec. Co., 175 N.L.R.B.
No. 108, 71 L.R.R.M. 1035 (1969); McLean Trucking Co., 175 N.L.R.B. No. 66, 71
L.R.R.M. 1051 (1969); Steves Sash & Door, Inc., 178 N.L.R.B. No. 27, 72 L.R.R.M. 1041
(1969) ; Dresser Indus. Valve & Instrument, 178 N.L.R.B. No. 51, 72 L.R.R.M. 1066 (1969).
Cf. United Aircraft Corp., 180 N.L.R.B. No. 49, 73 L.R.R.M. 1545 (1970).
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employee is discharged for engaging in protected activity it will
not defer because that federal issue is not within the special competency of the arbitrator. If serious, this approach would submerge
the Board's deference policies in discharge cases because an employee's unfair labor practice charge always alleges that he has
been punished for engaging in a protected activity. Protected
activity is a condition to all violations of section 8(a)(1) and (3).
If he is in error, even employer discrimination will not violate the
act and the charge will be dismissed. If his conduct was indeed
protected, then the employer's action constitutes a violation of
section 8(a)(1) and, perhaps, section 8(a)(3). The NLRB cannot
determine the merits, however, without a full scale review of the
record. But, if this is done, what operational significance would a
policy of deference have?
The Board on occasion has refused to defer to an arbitral
award on the ground that the arbitrator failed to consider whether
122
the employees were engaged in protected concerted activity.
The implication is that the Board might have deferred had these
issues been considered or, at least, been presented to the arbitrator.
In all cases of actual deference the employee has alleged that his
conduct was protected but the Board permitted the arbitrator, in
effect, to decide the federal question.ua Apparently, matters of federal law are within the competence of the arbitrator for deference
purposes after he decides the grievance but not before. Since this
conclusion cannot be taken at face value, another rationale will
have to be found. The key may simply be that since arbitration has
not yet occurred, there is no reason to delay reaching the merits of
the employee's case.
The Board sometimes states that it is deferring to an arbitration award and not passing on the merits of the charge. Indeed,
that is what "deference" must operationally mean-a review sufficient to satisfy the Board that the Spielberg standards have been
met, .but short of deciding the unfair labor practice charge. It is
122. See Ford Motor Co., 131 N.L.R.B. 1462 (1961).
123. See, e.g., W.R. Grace & Co., 179 N.L.R.B. No. 81, 72 L.R.R.M. 1455 (1969)
(wildcat) ; McLean Trucking Co., 175 N.L.R.B. No. 66, 71 L.R.R.M. 1051 (1969) (wildcat
strike and refusal to cross picket line); Western Elec. Co., 180 N.L.R.B. No. 18, 78
L.R.R.M. 1091 (1969) (Did employee resign so that she could not be discharged for
failing to tender dues under a maintenance-of-membership clause?); Eazor Express, Inc.,
172 N.L.R.B. No. 201, 69 L.R.R.M. 1081 (1968) (wildcat).
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unclear how much time is involved, that is, the extra time which
would be required to decide the case on its merits. If the case
clearly fails on the merits, presumably the General Counsel would
not have issued a charge. Indeed, the Board's efficient, informal
devices would have screened out this case. A policy of deference
is not generally needed since informal devices screen out over
ninety per cent of charges before formal proceedings are begun.
ARBITRAL DEFERENCE: AN OVERVIEW

There are, then, two possible operational reasons for the
Board's policy. First, the policy might guarantee the Board's nonintervention in areas better left for private resolution. As pointed
out above, that balance is not so one-sided in discharge cases. On
balance, the harm to federally protected interests seems to outweigh
possible interferences with arbitration procedures. The Board must
review the record to determine if the arbitrator raised the appropriate questions and to discover whether the proceedings were
fair. Thus, some degree of intervention is necessary even under
the Board's approach. 4 NLRB review of the federal charge would
not be a review of the arbitrator's decision but a vindication of
federal rights. The relevant questions are different, and, similarly,
the roles of the two tribunals are different. Determinations under a
contractual arbitration process will involve rights and remedies
which are separate and distinct from those involved in NLRB
proceedings. NLRB involvement is based upon public interests,
and rights and remedies are designed to vindicate public policies,
not to afford private relief to the grievant. The arbitrator's role,
on the other hand, is to advance the aims of the collective agreement that he has been chosen to interpret, and this role defines his
authority.
124. In Honolulu-Star Bulletin, Ltd., 123 N.L.R.B. 395 (1959), the Board refused to
defer because it found that dischargee's counsel was not permitted to participate in the
arbitration proceedings. The case is little different when the employee is not even
notified of the proceedings, at least as far as due process is concerned. The distinguishing
factor may be the Board's belief that the dischargee in Honolulu was engaged in protected conduct, whereas the Board was convinced that the employee in Harvester properly
lost before the arbitrator. The cases suggest that the review may go beyond procedural
matters, and involve the circumstances of the case. See Hershey Chocolate Corp., 129
N.L.R.B. 1052 (1960). If this is so, then a policy of deference does not totally avoid
intervention into private settlement machinery, nor does it substantially affect the
NLRB's work load.
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Second, the Board's deference policy might be seen as a reasonable method to reduce the NLRB's workload. Many of the abovementioned statements, are relevant here. The Spielberg standards
require some modest inquiry into the case in any event; indeed,
NLRB time is actually diverted from the merits of a statutory
violation charged against an employer to questions involving the
procedures and result of an arbitration.125 Deference is unnecessary
to weed out frivolous charges for the Board's informal screening
devices are extremely effective for this purpose. And, again, the concern for workload does not explain the stated policy of non-deferral
in pre-arbitration or refusal to bargain cases.
A consideration which relates to both of the asserted justifications for deferral is the impact of a reversal of NLRB policy on the
NLRB's workload and arbitration systems. The impact, admittedly,
cannot be precisely determined, but it may well be slight. First,
it is doubtful that employees filing charges with the Board are even
aware of the NLRB's present deference policies. Thus, it is unclear that a non-deference policy will encourage more unfair labor
practice charges. True, more time will have to be spent on meritorious claims, but this is hardly disturbing given the importance
of these claims. The critical question is basically one of priorities,
and the theme of this article has been that individual interests have
received, at least in discharge-deferral cases, too low a position in
the Board's hierarchy of values.
Nor will the possibility of NLRB action interfere with arbitration systems. The employee is seeking the protection of a federal
right, not the review of a contractual issue. Thus, an NLRB finding of a statutory violation does not necessarily impugn the integrity of the arbitrator or the arbitration system. The fear of interference with arbitration procedures is based primarily upon an
erroneous equation of the role and functions of arbitration with
that of the NLRB.
Assuming the Board finds its standards for deference satisfied
despite the General Counsel's issuance of a charge, deference forecloses further inquiry into the merits. Following from the above
discussion, a nonfrivolous charge, persuasive enough to convince
125. Of course, the statutory violation may directly relate to the arbitration pro.
ceeding, e.g., the employee charges that the representation he received violates §
8 (b) (1) (A), and the employer's collusion or other actions violate § § 8 (a) (1) or (8).
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the General Counsel, is rejected because of an arbitrator's opinion
upholding the employer's action. Even if no charge is ever issued, deference by regional offices suggests also that meritorious
charges are rejected since otherwise normal screening devices
would serve adequately without a policy of deference.
Thus, whether deference is looked upon as a device to promote and encourage private settlement or a device to screen out
meritorious charges thought unworthy of the NLRB's time, the
harm done in individual cases seems excessive.

CONCLUSION

The concern for the protection of individual interests and the
enforcement of federal law will no doubt be considered naive by
many informed persons in the area. One urging more sensitivity
to the rights of individual employees is often tempted to drag out
his credentials to prove that he does indeed sympathize with the
aspirations of labor and is not a mouthpiece for hostile forces. I
have resisted the strong tendency to demonstrate that, although
perhaps misguided, I am basically a good fellow. Although I do
not expect any system to be just in the pure sense, I believe our
systems and institutions are strong enough to become more just.
Arbitration awards which "overprotect" employees may well
exceed cases of underprotection, 126 but "perfection rather than
adequacy is the only worthwhile standard, especially in a system
' 127
of adjudication dependent solely on confidence in the judges.'

That goal applies to the NLRB as well as to arbitrators. Employees
will trust the results reached only if they perceive that the means
used were fair and reasonable. In the final result, the real interests
of the parties will be best served by a sensitivity to individual rights
which in a particular case might conflict with short-run institutional interests.
126.

Wirtz, supra note 74, at 83.

127.

Id.

